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Disputation of Relevant Facts as set out by Appellee
First, Appellant, Mr. Nelson, asserts that the Brief of Appellee does not
comport with Rule 24(a)(7) or Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in
that the vast majority of references to facts, pleadings below, or acts of the Trial
Court, do not contain citations to the record.
1.

Mr. Nelson disputes Ms Nelson's assertion that he was "temporarily

demobilized", as claimed in 5 5 of Brief of Appellee. The record shows that Mr.
Nelson was demobilized, see November 18, 2004, Transcript, p. 7, lines 2 - 8 , and
Record at 100; nowhere can counsel locate in the record anything about the demobilization being temporary.
2.

Ms Nelson cites nothing to support her claims set out at 5J 6; Mr. Nel-

son disputes the same.
3.

Mr. Nelson disputes Ms Nelson's assertions made in 5J10; Mr. Nelson

had the same counsel throughout the Order to Show Cause issue, up to his hiring of
his current counsel.
4.

Mr. Nelson disputes Ms Nelson's allegations contained in 5 18, and

refers this court to his Response to Objection to Rule 26 Motion & Memorandum
in Support of Objection with affidavit attached, which was filed with this Court on
June 27,2005.

ARGUMENT:
Appellee's Point One: Did the Trial Court modify the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter, or did it simply clarify and enforce the Decree?
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I

Appellee agrees that a trial court cannot modify a decree of divorce on

a law and motion calendar:
Ms Nelson, the Appellee herein, agrees with Mr. Nelson, the Appellant, that
the Trial Court cannot modify a decree of divorce upon an Order to Show Cause or
motion calendar. Ms Nelson's Brief, p. 11.
Ms Nelson cites Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, (Utah App. 1994) and
Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1992) in support of that proposition —
that the Trial Court cannot modify a decree of divorce upon an Order to Show
Cause or motion calendar. Id. Both Wells and Grover were cited by Mr. Nelson
as supporting exactly that premise; the trial court's inability to modify a decree of
divorce on a law and motion calendar; a petition for modification must be filed and
served with opportunity to be heard. See Mr. Nelson's Brief, pp. 17 - 20.
Ms Nelson therefore agrees that any modification of a decree of divorce
must proceed by the filling of a petition and service, pursuant to Rule 4, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. It is settled; there can be no modification of a decree of divorce
by way of a motion or order to show cause, as occurred in this matter at the Trial
Court.

II.

Ms Nelson's assertion that no modification was sought or obtained is

wrong:
Ms Nelson, in defense of the Trial Court's actions, argues in the alternative
that the underlying pleadings did not seek a modification of the Decree of Divorce,
and hence there is no modification, or that the actions of the Trial Court were just
"interpreting" an ambiguous alimony provision. See Ms Nelson's Brief, pp. 12
4

45.
Ms Nelson asserts that she did not seek a modification of the Decree of Divorce in this matter, see Ms Nelson's Brief at p. 12; she is correct that she did not
file any petition for modification. See Trial Court Docket in appendix.
However, Ms Nelson did ask the court to "alter; change in incidental or subordinate features; enlarge, extend; amend; limit, reduce" the Decree of Divorce on
the issue of alimony. Black's Law Dictionary, 905 (5th ed, 1979), definition of
modify.
Ms Nelson specifically requested that the Trial Court order Mr. Nelson to
pay alimony in the full amount of $886 for the months after Mr. Nelson's demobilization. Record at 80,5 6. Ms Nelson specifically asked the Trial Court to modify the Decree of Divorce; contrary to her statements in her Brief that she did not
ask for a modification. See Brief of Appellee at pp. 12.
Next in her Brief, Ms Nelson asserts that Mr. Nelson erred because he did
not file the proper pleadings; he did not file a motion to strike or some similar filing. See Ms Nelson's Brief at p. 12.
As pointed out in Mr. Nelson's Brief, Mr. Nelson did oppose, both in writing
and in argument, any change in the alimony provision of the Decree of Divorce,
asserting that it meant what it said — that Mr. Nelson's alimony obligation to Ms
Nelson was to be decreased to $200 per month when Mr. Nelson was demobilized.
No special form or pleading is required; Utah is not a form-pleading state,
but a notice pleading state. See, Rule 8(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
H

[U]nder Utah's liberal notice pleading requirements, [however,] all that is required

is that the pleadings be sufficient to give fair notice of the nature and basis of the
5

claim asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403,406 (Utah 1998) (citation and internal
quotations omitted)." Guardian Title Co. v. Mitchell, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 2002
UT 63, 54 P.3d 130, 133 (Utah, 2002). Mr. Nelson's disputation of Ms Nelson's
assertions at the Trial Court level provided sufficient notice to preserve his position.

HI.

Interpretation of the Decree's Alimony Provision:
Ms Nelson argues that paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce, which per-

tains to Mr. Nelson's ongoing alimony obligation, was not quoted in relevant part,
is facially ambiguous, and that there is no factual ambiguity. Ms Nelson' Brief, pp.
12-15.
The unaltered and non-emphasized content of paragraph 10 of the Decree is:
"It is reasonable and proper that while Respondent is employed in this present capacity as a major with the United States Army, in Fort Carson,
Colorado, Respondent pay alimony to Petitioner in the amount of $866.00
per month, with one-half due on or before the 5th and one-half due on or before the 20th of each month, continuing until Respondent is demobilized or
until such time as Petitioner remarries, cohabits, or dies, whichever occurs
first. The parties agree that upon Respondent's demobilization, Alimony
(sic) will be reduced to $200.00 per month, with one-half due on or before
the 5th and one-half due on or before the 20th of each month, continuing for
a period of 7 years from demobilization or until such time as Petitioner remarries, cohabits, or dies, whichever occurs first."
Record at 67.

What the parties created, is a Decree of Divorce that appears to mix findings
of fact and conclusions at law in with the actual decree and order of the court. Orders, be they a final order, an order on temporary matters, or an order based upon
6

an agreement of parties, are all essentially the same, and are made up of four parts;
the caption, the recitals, the directions, and the signature. 56 Am Jur 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders, § 36 (1971). The recital section sets forth procedural information, such as whose motion, notice, and appearances. Id. The directions, generally
the enumerated paragraphs, state the disposition made on the issues by the court.
Id. "If a party is commanded by the order to do or to refrain from doing an act, the
order should be sufficiently specific to enable him to understand his duty." Id.
Findings of fact and conclusions at law are not necessary for the Order to be sufficient, but are listed separate and apart from the order, so that the directions to the
parties can be clear.
Paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce in this matter does provide clear directions to the parties. It states:
a.

"that while Respondent is employed in this present capacity as a

major with the United States Army, in Fort Carson, Colorado,"
b.

Respondent pay alimony to Petitioner in the amount of $866.00

per month..."
c.

continuing until
Respondent is demobilized or
until such time as Petitioner remarries, cohabits, or dies,
whichever occurs first.

Paragraph 10 continues, stating that "ft]he parties agree that upon Respondent's demobilization, Alimony (sic) will be reduced to $200.00 per month...".
No matter how one looks at paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce, it is
clear that Mr. Nelson's alimony obligation is "continuing until Respondent is de7

mobilized,,.", and that "[t]he parties agree that upon Respondent's demobilization,
Alimony will be reduced to $200.00 per month..,"

There is no ambiguity there,

Mr. Nelson's demobilization is the controlling factor that triggers an alimony reduction, and quite specifically, that reduction is to $200.00 per month. Even Ms
Nelson admits this fact — she states that "[t]he decree further provided that, in the
event Appellant/Respondent was demobilized, his alimony obligation would be reduced to $200 per month. See Brief of Appellee, p.7, J 4.
Ms Nelson cites no authority to substantiate her claims that the action of the
Trial Court was merely an interpretation of paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce.
That is because no authority can be found to support her position.
In fact, Utah case law is contrary to Ms Nelson's position. That is because:
"[i]f a judgment can mean one thing one day and something else on another
day, there would be no reason to suppose that the litigation had been set at
rest. The same must be said if the judgment can mean one thing to one
judge and something else to another judge. All are bound by the original
language used, and all ought to interpret the language the same way. No
court should express an opinion of what the judgment means until the judgment is called into question by some factual situation relating thereto. The
judge who tried the case and who ought to know what he meant to say, after
the time for appeal, etc., has passed cannot any more change or cancel one
word of the judgment than can any other judge.'
Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 335,445 P.2d 701,702 - 703 (Utah 1968).
Crofts involved a divorce action wherein three years after the entry of that
decree of divorce Petitioner filed a "Petition for Interpretation of Decree of Divorce and to have Defendant Render an Accounting". Crofts, 21 Utah 2d at 333 334, 445 P.2d at 702. A hearing was held, and an "Amended Decision" and
"Declaratory Judgment" filed. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]he so-called declaratory judgment

8

insofar as it undertakes to modify or clarify the original decree is a nullity." Id.
In making that determination, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned that:
"the finality of aJudgment must be respected in order to insure the rights of
parties. Section 3 0 - 3 - 5 , U.C.A.1953, provides:
* * * Such subsequent changes or new orders may be made by the court with
respect to the disposal of the children or the distribution of property as shall
be reasonable and proper.
This, however, requires some good cause based upon a change of circumstances for modifying the decree and cannot be done by interpreting the
language thereof. Litigation must be put to an end, and it is the function of a
final judgment to do just that. A judgment is the final consideration and determination of a court on matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding.
(49 C I S . Judgments s 1.)...
There are certain remedies available to a dissatisfied litigant to have the
court change or correct a judgment, viz., a motion for a new trial, a motion
to amend, an appeal to the Supreme Court. When the time for appeal has
passed, there is nothing further to be done in that particular case towards
changing or modifying the judgment except as indicated above."
Crop, 21 Utah 2d at 334 - 335,445 R2d at 702 - 703.
Ms Nelson undertook none of the remedies mentioned therein. Her own
counsel approved the language which she is now questioning; so she had full assistance of counsel to ensure paragraph 10 of her Decree of Divorce would be clear
and unambiguous.
All of Ms Nelson's rhetoric aside, the bottom line is that the Trial Court
changed the language of paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce, so as to nullify the
automatic reduction of alimony when Mr. Nelson was demobilized. That action
was, and is, a change, a material change to what the parties agreed and what was
signed as an order of the Trial Court. By any other name, that action was a modification of the Decree of Divorce.

9

Appellee's Point Two: Can a Trial Court interpret and enforce a Decree of
Divorce?
I.

Enforcement of a Decree of Divorce:
Mr. Nelson does not dispute the Trial Court's power to enforce the terms of

a Decree of Divorce; he does not raise this as an issue in this case, and has not argued it. The point of this entire appeal is that the Trial Court did not enforce the
terms of the Decree of Divorce, rather it substituted its opinion of what it thought
the parties actually meant when they entered their stipulation. The Trial Court
substituted its language on the alimony provision for that actual language used in
the Decree of Divorce; and in doing so, materially changed the meaning of that alimony provision.
That action is a change, or modification, of the original language. As noted
in Point One above, a decree cannot be modified on a law and motion calendar or
by an Order to Show Cause.
II.

Interpretation of a Decree of Divorce:
Ms Nelson's arguments in this section are the same arguments she raised

under Point One of her Brief. Mr. Nelson has fully responded to this in Point One
hereinabove, and herein reasserts and reiterates his argument contained under Point
One of this Brief.
Appellee's Point Three:

The Soldiers' and Sailors' Act does not prevent

the enforcement of a currently valid Order of the Court.
Ms Nelson argues that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.
10

501, et seq. does not apply to this action, and "does not prevent the enforcement of
a currently valid Order of the Court." Brief of Appellee, Point Three, pp. 16 -17.
In fact, she denies the law of this case: the Trial Court has stayed any execution upon its orders, based upon the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. Record
at 146 - 148. Yet, Ms Nelson has filed no appeal to that decision of the Trial
Court, to prevent her from enforcing the order she obtained in this matter.
Her assertion on this point flies in the face of the facts of this case and the
Order of the Trial Court. Ms Nelson cites no authority for her assertion and no basis whatsoever for her claims on this point.
Ms Nelson's sole support for her assertions raised under this point is Army
Regulation 608-99, which she reproduced in the addendum to her Brief. What she
did not bring to this court's attention, is that Regulation 608-99 "is designed to improve procedures for enforcing financial support, child custody, paternity, and related obligations within the DA [Department of the Army]. § l-l(b), and that § 1-5,
which is cited by Ms Nelson, "does not prohibit a commander from assisting a soldier to invoke the protections of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act", § 15c(3).
Regulation 608-99, applies within the Army, not outside of it; and Regulation 608-99 itself recognizes the "protections of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act"- It allows commanders to assist soldiers in invoking those protections.
As such, Regulation 608-99 fully supports the reliefs and protections to which Mr.
Nelson is entitled under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.
As noted above, the Trial Court in this matter has recognized that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act does, in fact, prevent the enforcement of a cur11

rently valid order; the Trial Court granted a stay of execution on its order, specifically under the authority of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. Record at
146 - 148.
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act is applicable to defending against
a pending action, as admitted by Ms. Nelson. Brief of Appellee, p. 16,5 1. It can
also be used to prevent the enforcement of a current valid order. See Record at 146
-148.
Conclusion:
The Decree of Divorce, and the underlying Stipulation upon which that Decree was based, clearly stated that "[t]he parties agree that upon Respondent's [Mr.
Nelson's] demobilization, Alimony will be reduced to $200.00 per month..."
Record at 27 - 28, 57, 67. The parties agree that Mr. Nelson was demobilized.
Record at Record at 90 - 92, 100; see also Brief of Appellee at p.7, $ 4, and
November 18, 2004, Transcript, p. 7, lines 2 - 8 . Therefore, his alimony obligation
to Ms Nelson was reduced to $200 per month.
Nothing in the record shows any other condition; the reduction in alimony
was automatic upon Mr. Nelson's demobilization, without any regard to his income, employment, or other concern, subsequent to that demobilization. Per the
clear language of the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Nelson's subsequent income after
demobilization was irrelevant ~ Mr. Nelson's alimony obligation dropped to $200
upon his being demobilized.
The Trial Court changed that provision of the Decree of Divorce, ruled that
Mr. Nelson had to continue to pay alimony in the prior amount of $886 per month,
12

and that a change in income was required in order for Mr. Nelson to reduce his
alimony obligation to Ms Nelson, That ruling is a modification of the Decree of
Divorce on the issue of alimony; that ruling completely set aside the condition that,
"[t]he parties agree that upon Respondent's [Mr. Nelson's] demobilization, Alimony will be reduced to $200.00 per month...".

Whether one calls that act as

interpretation, enforcement, or anything else, the Trial Court changed the content
and meaning of the Decree of Divorce on the issue of alimony; and it did so on a
law and motion calendar, in violation of Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
That action is clear error. The orders of the Trial Court need to be reversed.
This court should remand this matter to the Trial Court, directing that all orders entered by the Trial Court on this issue be stricken.

Respectfully submitted this l( day of July, 2005.

/i
DAVID R. HARTWIG, ESQ.
Attorney for Appellant, Mr. Nelson
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this V day of July, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply
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Brief of Appellant was deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and
addressed to:

Sidney Balthasar Unrau
3610 North University Avenue
Suite 375
Provo, Utah 84604

Attorney for Petitioner
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